Director, Russia Studies at CNA. Senior Adjunct Fellow, CNAS. I follow Russian military capabilities, operations & strategy. Opinions are mine alone, hopefully.

Washington DC area
Joined May 2020
Michael Kofman retweeted
Good Geolocation. Russian Naval infantry recently redeploying from Mariupol to the north. At this point in linked film they are approx 30km south of Volnovakha.
Replying to @200_zoka
@GeoConfirmed 47.30199, 37.41497 Russian army elements leaving Mariupol area
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Michael Kofman retweeted
We are back! @KofmanMichael and I discuss the latest developments in the war and the outline of the endgame that is emerging now. Join us tonight! nitter.net/i/spaces/1OdKrBZ…
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Michael Kofman retweeted
NEW: Ukrainian Military Intelligence reports that two Russian generals were killed & one was wounded in a strike on 🇷🇺 command near occupied Kherson, per @KyivIndependent. If confirmed, this would bring the death toll of Russian generals killed in Ukraine to 9 dead in two months
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I want to give this person a shout out, they do really good tactical-operational sitreps on the war.
1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 55-57: The past 72 hrs. have seen the Kremlin declare “victory” in Mariupol, with Ukrainian resistance continuing in the Azovstal area. Russia keeps up pressure in the Severodonetsk Salient with only marginal gains. #UkraineRussiaWar #Ukraine
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Good piece by Rob.
I wrote about the fight in the Donbas. I think Russia will likely have some tactical successes but it will be slow, costly, and probably won't lead to strategic gains. Attrition is already a problem, and it will limit what the Russian military can achieve. economist.com/by-invitation/…
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The defense community term for a while had been Russian led forces. In this war the two 'separatist' army corps are largely operating as an extension of 8th CAA.
Good thread here. A related question, is whether it’s better to call L/DNR authorities/forces “Ru proxies” or “separatists.” IMO both are accurate, $ they still have agency, but as time has passed their autonomy from Moscow was waned so much they they are now clearly proxies.
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In the south, Russian forces had been tied down in Mariupol. Putin’s announcement that they are going to avoid storming Azovstal probably reflects that they can’t afford to lose further manpower and need those units for the Donbas offensive. 7/
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Even still, it’s unclear if the southern axis of the planned offensive will be more than a fixing action. The Southern Military District's forces have been mauled over 2 months of fighting. This means a larger operational envelopment is probably beyond their means to support. 8/
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Russian forces in the southwest around Kherson city are struggling to consolidate a defensible perimeter west of the river. The units deployed there are relatively light, and under pressure. They could even be forced over time to retreat east across the Dnipro. 9/
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Ukraine has been deploying reinforcements to Zaporizhia, Donbas & Kharkiv. Russia has made little effort to disrupt ground lines of communication into the Donbas. This means that a Russian success is at best contingent & UKR could be in position to launch counteroffensives. 10/
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Expansion of support to include armor, IFVs, and artillery is going to allow Ukraine to replace losses and equip reserve brigades (esp artillery and ammunition which Ukraine needs). Hence the general trajectory of correlation of forces in this war is not in Russia’s favor. 11/
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If the Russian military sends units in piecemeal, sticking to roads, with narrow advances – they will be defeated by UKR as they have in other battles. I’ve seen them make adjustments in some areas, but some of the problems are structural. 12/
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Reticent to make any predictions on how the battle for the Donbas will go. These things are contingent, and it depends. The outcome can range from Russian forces making gains to suffering another significant defeat. 13/
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Dvornikov's appointment changes little. There’s not much distinguishing him from other Russian generals. The more pertinent question is how/if the Russian military has reorganized command and control, air support, and logistics for this offensive. 14/
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Donbas is a relatively urban region. Russian forces likely need Severodonetsk to control Luhansk and Slovyansk + Kramatorsk in order to claim they have captured Donetsk. These could end up prolonged and costly fights in urban terrain. 15/
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I think it is fair to say that the decisive period of the war was the first three weeks (maybe even first 4 days). Whatever happens in this next phase, the Russian military is likely to exhaust its offensive potential in the near term. 16/
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Does this presage a stalemate? Not necessarily. UKR has its own offensive options. Russia may next try to consolidate control over territory held and pressure UKR via blockade. Its too early to predict what the next phase might look like & it depends on what UKR chooses to do.
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Sorry opening post should say 'take' not 'retake' - blame jetlag.
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I’m going to make another follow up thread on force availability, with some added info since the last time I addressed that subject.
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Michael Kofman retweeted
Three months ago, we published this article by @KofmanMichael and I'm struck by how much he got right. It holds up well in terms of predicting what Russia would try to do and why. And noted that Moscow might be suffering from "war optimism" @WarOnTheRocks warontherocks.com/2022/01/pu…
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