My argument regarding Russia's behavior:
1) Moscow switched from deterrence to compellence
2) The key issue is Moscow believes Kyiv will remain hostile and is increasing its defensive capabilities
3) the costs of inaction are greater than an escalation
fpri.org/article/2022/01/mos…
It seems Russia's goals in Ukraine have gone through three phases:
1) Regime change (probably lasted through the first 1-2 weeks)
2) Compellence
3) Medium to long-term occupation of more Ukrainian territory
Vladimir Putin has lost interest in diplomatic efforts to end the war, according to three people briefed on conversations with the Russian president.
Instead, he appears set on seizing as much Ukrainian territory as possible.
New, with @HenryJFoy:
ft.com/content/a16c4ecd-e835…
Worth noting that a long-term occupation of more Ukrainian territory comes with serious risks and costs for Russia. It has committed the vast majority of its ground units to the war in Ukraine. The Russian military isn't in a great position to respond to other crises.
This appears to be the Polish Warmate loitering munition - AFAIK, Ukraine has obtained some before the war and might have received more after the war started.
With their 40km range, they should be quite effective.
#Ukraine: As a few of the NLAW launchers delivered to Ukraine by the UK have ran into battery issues (Running out too fast, or not functioning well in the cold), well, as ever, local forces are coming up with solutions.
I wrote about the fight in the Donbas. I think Russia will likely have some tactical successes but it will be slow, costly, and probably won't lead to strategic gains. Attrition is already a problem, and it will limit what the Russian military can achieve.
economist.com/by-invitation/…
An additional point. MANPADS are still an issue for Russian helicopters near the front lines, but it isn't clear how strong Ukraine's short and medium-range air defenses are near the Donbas. Russia's ability to conduct air strikes effectively could be critical.