WhatsApp: Apple is bad for scanning for CSAM. This is the wrong approach and we would *never* do this. WhatsApp (but quieter) in 2018: we also do this and have since 2011. judiciary.senate.gov/imo/med…

9:07 PM · Aug 6, 2021

20
163
8
492
The completely perverse thing about the whole discussion is that *on-device* scanning enables you to do equivalent levels of CSAM protection *and then also encrypt everything in the cloud*.
4
13
1
85
Replying to @pwnallthethings
isn't it a legal requirement to actively patrol for CSAM if you run any kind of "platform" or "service" - hard to see how the entire "i" system is not exactly that at this point
1
0
0
0
My MacBook Pro's hard drive doesn't operate as a subscription and I'm not backing up to iCloud. Your take is basically that the cops waste their time with a lot of unnecessary warrants on privately-owned Apple devices.
1
0
0
1
Replying to @pwnallthethings
Seems like WhatsApp isn't scanning message contents, just metadata
0
0
0
2
Replying to @pwnallthethings
That says WhatsApp is only doing it on unencrypted things like profile pictures and group names, tho? Am I reading it wrong?
0
0
0
1
Replying to @pwnallthethings
WhatsApp is scanning photos in user reports and public profile images, not local photos pre or post upload/send.
1
1
0
14
And Apple is scanning iCloud photos designated for backup that they can currently already decrypt.
3
0
0
6
Replying to @pwnallthethings
Did you even read what it says in your 2nd screenshot?
0
0
0
2
Replying to @pwnallthethings
Not sure that’s entirely fair, given what’s written in that screenshot. I get the example you’re presenting, but I also think it’ll confuse a bunch of people.
2
0
0
9
I think folks conflating scanning of iCloud photos and iMessage is what's confusing. This is scanning of content that isn't E2E.
2
0
0
5